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Abstract 
Title/Research question: Does ownership structure explain the zero-leverage puzzle? 
Authors: Ásta Brá Hafsteinsdóttir and Snædís Helgadóttir 
Supervisor: Håkan Jankensgård 
Theoretical framework: Modigliani and Miller Theorems, Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order 
Theory, Market Timing Theory, Agency theory, theories regarding ownership structure. 
Method: Quantitative approach using logit model regressions with panel data to interpret 
the relationship between ownership structure and zero- and almost zero-leverage. 
Conclusion: The results confirm that the zero-leverage phenomenon does indeed exist on 
the Swedish market and that the characteristics of these firms are largely consistent with 
research from other countries. The main finding of this thesis is that ownership structure 
can partly explain the zero-leverage puzzle in financially constrained firms only.  
Key words: Zero-leverage puzzle, zero-leverage, almost zero-leverage, ownership 
structure, concentrated ownership, diffuse ownership, owner identity, institutional 
owners, private owners.  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background and problem discussion that forms the basis for the 
thesis. Additionally the purpose and the research contribution will be presented along with 
the research question. Finally, the chapter ends with the thesis outline. 
1.1 Background 
The zero-leverage puzzle is a mystery in the field of corporate finance, since, according to 
capital structure theories such as the Modigliani and Miller Theorems, the Trade-off 
Theory, the Pecking Order Theory, and the Market Timing Theory, companies should have 
at least some debt on their balance sheet (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963; Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Baker & Wurgler, 2002). However, that is not 
always the case as well-known companies worldwide, such as Apple, H&M and 
Amazon.com, have been known for being debt free. But how can this possible lack of debt 
in a firm's capital structure be explained? This is a question researchers all over the world 
have been trying to answer but none have, to our knowledge, been able to fully explain 
this puzzle (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013; Dang, 2013; Bessler, Drobetz, Haller & Meier, 2013). 
The zero-leverage puzzle has been widely reported by the financial press in the United 
States, and at the end of the last fiscal year 25 firms out of the S&P 500 index were debt 
free (Krantz, 2014). Contrastingly, even though this phenomenon also exists in the 
European market, media evidence is much harder to come by. Nevertheless, Bessler et al. 
(2013) conducted an international research on the zero-leverage phenomenon where 15 
out of the 20 countries they researched were European. They conclude that zero-leverage 
exists in all 20 countries they studied, where the lowest percentage of zero-leverage firms 
was found in the United Kingdom (2,58%), while the highest was in Australia (38,13%). An 
interesting fact is that Norway, Finland and Denmark were included in their study, while 
Sweden was left out. Therefore, a search for zero-leverage information on the Swedish 
market was conducted without any luck, which triggered an interest in researching the 
zero-leverage puzzle in Sweden.  
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When researching the zero-leverage phenomenon, the fact that zero-leverage may not 
be voluntary needs to be addressed. In many cases firms would like to have some debt on 
their balance sheet, but due to certain firm characteristics they possess, they simply 
cannot. This is more likely for smaller, younger firms with more volatile earnings and less 
tangibility (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013; Dang, 2013; Bessler et al., 2013). Generally, this 
applies to firms on smaller markets that are usually excluded from this type of research. In 
this research, however, the smaller exchanges in Sweden will be included, and therefore it 
is essential to see if the firms examined here hold zero-leverage willingly or not.  
1.2 Problem discussion 
The phenomenon in question was first referred to as the zero-leverage puzzle by 
Strebulaev and Yang in their working paper from 2006 which was later published in the 
Journal of Financial Economics in 2013. In their research two dependent variables were 
used, zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage. In this research, however, the dependent 
variable will be a combination of both. 
In recent years interest in the zero-leverage phenomenon has increased which is 
evident when considering the number of published articles addressing this puzzle (Devos, 
Dhillon, Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy, 2012; Bessler et al., 2013; Byoun & Xu , 2013; 
Dang, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). Existing literature addresses the puzzle from many 
different angles, such as managerial features and governance characteristics (Devos et al., 
2012; Byoun & Xu, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013), firm specific factors such as age, size, 
profitability, tangibility, industry etc. (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 
2013), and macroeconomic factors, like GDP growth rate (Dang, 2013).  
Despite this growing literature none have, as far as we have observed, tried to explain 
the zero-leverage puzzle primarily with ownership structure, though Devos et al. (2012) 
use block ownership as a proxy for external governance mechanism in a study on the 
relationship between zero-leverage and management entrenchment. Ownership is 
believed to influence corporate governance and firm specific factors, such as capital 
structure (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Therefore, it is not 
unlikely that ownership structure could explain the zero-leverage puzzle. 
When further examining ownership structure, the focus will be on two types of 
ownership distinctions: diffuse ownership and concentrated ownership. When ownership 
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is diffuse no single investor has incentive to monitor, and therefore the manager may end 
up with excessive power (Holderness, 2009). Due to the manager's risk aversion he may 
use his power to limit risk in the capital structure, possibly resulting in zero-leverage. 
However, when ownership is concentrated large investors have more incentive to 
monitor, limiting the free-rider problem, and therefore the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers which should reduce the probability of a firm having zero-leverage (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, ownership identity will be examined as well, since it is known 
that the identity of the largest controlling owner may affect capital structure. It is worth 
noting, however, that when ownership is diffuse owner identity is irrelevant since no 
single investor has decisive power (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
The ownership structure in Sweden differs from the much researched Anglo-Saxon 
model, in that ownership in Sweden is much more concentrated, and even supported by 
the government. The concentration is a result of extensive use of dual class shares and 
pyramidal structures, which generates a large gap between cash-flow rights and control 
rights (Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt & Svancar, 2002). Moreover, the Swedish civil law legal 
system promotes ownership concentration since it is known to have weaker investor 
protection than common law countries such as the United States (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). The Swedish model promotes institutional ownership 
where large commercial banks, such as SEB and Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB), are often 
block owners in successful Swedish corporations, supporting them financially. 
Furthermore, block ownership is also common among Swedish families such as the 
Wallenberg family and the Kamprad family (Agnblad et al., 2002). This high degree of 
ownership concentration makes researching the zero-leverage phenomenon in the 
Swedish market really interesting. 
The purpose of this research is to fill the gap in this field of research by testing the 
relationship between ownership structure and zero-leverage. Which leads to the research 
question:  
 
Does ownership structure explain the zero-leverage puzzle? 
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1.3 Research contribution 
This study contributes to the research field in at least two ways. Firstly, it is unique since, 
to our knowledge, there has not been any previous research attempting to explain the 
puzzle primarily with ownership structure. Secondly, this research will be conducted on 
listed Swedish firms on the NASDAQ OMX, First North, NGM and AktieTorget stock 
exchanges. In this regard, the research distinguishes itself from other related work on the 
zero-leverage puzzle, since it not only examines the largest stock exchange but also 
considers the smaller markets.  
1.4 Outline 
This paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, section 2 will provide the 
theoretical background, which forms the foundation for the thesis. Section 3 then 
describes the data and methodology of the study and section 4 presents the univariate 
analysis. Section 5 then reports and discusses the multivariate analysis and finally, section 
6 presents the concluding discussion. 
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2 Literature review and hypotheses 
In the subsequent chapter theoretical framework and relevant previous literature will be 
reviewed and hypotheses constructed. The purpose is to provide the reader with sufficient 
understanding of the theoretical foundation that will be used to form the hypotheses of 
the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter provides a framework for analysing the results of the 
research. 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
In the following section the theoretical foundation will be reviewed. Starting with theories 
from the capital structure field, moving on to agency problems, and finishing with 
ownership structure theories. At the end of each subchapter, theoretical implications for 
zero-leverage are explored. 
2.1.1 Capital structure 
2.1.1.1 Modigliani & Miller Theorems 
In 1958 Modigliani and Miller set forth the first capital structure theory, in which they 
state that there exists no such thing as an optimal structure. It is called the irrelevance 
proposition theorem, suggesting that capital structure is irrelevant when it comes to firm 
value. However, due to their strict assumptions; (1) the firm’s investment decisions are 
pre-determined, (2) no corporate or personal taxes, (3) no financial distress costs, (4) 
information is symmetric to all market participants and (5) no transactions or issuance 
costs, their theory only holds in a perfect market.  
In 1963 they published a correction of their earlier propositions, and relaxed the 
assumption of no taxes. In doing so, they withdrew their statement of no optimal capital 
structure, and instead proposed that there exists an optimal capital structure and it 
consists of only debt. The logic being that interest payments are tax deductible, while 
dividends are not, resulting in a higher firm value when including more debt. 
2.1.1.2 Trade-off Theory 
Relaxing the assumption of no financial distress costs, in addition to the no tax 
assumption, many researchers have shown that the value of the firm is affected by its 
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capital structure (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984, etc.). The 
Trade-off Theory posits that the optimal capital structure is where the marginal tax 
benefits of increasing leverage is equal to the expected marginal cost of financial distress. 
This suggests that the company should be financed somewhere between sole equity and 
sole debt where each firm has a unique optimum. However, due to the difficulty of 
estimating the cost of financial distress, as will be explained below, a unique optimum is 
hard to detect, so instead researchers identify an optimal leverage range (Brigham & 
Daves, 2007). 
Graham (2000) was the first to estimate the tax benefits of debt by quantifying the 
marginal tax rate for each firm individually. Tax benefits of debt are obtained by deducting 
interest payments from earnings and thus reducing tax paid. Graham (2000) estimates the 
value of these tax benefits to be 9,7 percent of market value of the typical firm. 
Furthermore he estimates that most firms are greatly under levered and on average, by 
adding leverage up to the optimum point, would add 15 percent to firm value in tax 
benefits.  
Direct expected cost of financial distress was first quantified by Warner in 1977, where 
he estimated it to be on average 5,3 percent of market value of the firm in the month 
bankruptcy petition was filed. The indirect cost was quantified by Andrade and Kaplan in 
1998, and was estimated to be between 10 and 23 percent of firm value at default. 
However, as can be seen by the size of the interval, the estimation is rather imprecise. The 
reason for this large interval is the difficulty of estimating these indirect costs. That is, it is 
difficult to estimate the cost in case of bankruptcy, and even harder to estimate the 
likelihood of a given firm becoming bankrupt. Since total bankruptcy cost consists of both 
direct and indirect costs, the estimation of the total expected cost of financial distress is 
hard to quantify prior to actual bankruptcy.  
2.1.1.3 Pecking Order Theory 
When Myers and Majluf (1984) constructed the Pecking Order Theory, they relaxed an 
additional assumption, symmetric information. Asymmetric information is when 
information is unevenly distributed among market participants, causing buyers to require 
discount when they cannot confirm the quality of the seller's product (Akerlof, 1970). This 
happens in the market when firms issue securities, where firms are sellers and investors 
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are buyers. Due to information asymmetries, which are persistent in real capital markets, 
firms prefer to use the financing that is available to them that bears the least asymmetric 
information costs. That is, they prefer internal funds to debt, and issue equity only as a 
last resort. Therefore, according to their theory there is no optimal capital structure, firms 
simply choose their financing in the aforementioned order. At least, if there exists an 
optimum, the cost associated with diverging from that optimum must be immaterial 
compared to the cost of adjusting back to it (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
2.1.1.4 Market Timing Theory 
Baker and Wurgler in 2002, like Myers and Majluf (1984), relaxed the assumption of 
symmetric information and introduced the Market Timing Theory. They argued that 
managers, believing that investors are irrational, can exploit the asymmetries between 
investors and the firm by timing the market. This involves issuing equity when it is 
overvalued, and repurchasing when undervalued. Thus, the Market Timing Theory 
suggests that there is no optimal capital structure, rather it results from managers' past 
attempts to time the market. However, this theory, originating from the behavioural 
finance field, has been questioned by traditionalists, since according to the efficient 
market hypothesis, the market is efficient, and therefore, any attempts to time the market 
should not be value creating (Fama, 1970). 
2.1.1.5 Theoretical implications of capital structure regarding zero-leverage 
The Modigliani & Miller Theorems, even though not empirically reliable, form the basis for 
the majority of capital structure theories. The former theorems could possibly explain the 
zero-leverage puzzle, but, since capital structure decisions are not made in a perfect 
market, there is still a need for an alternative explanation. Moreover, the second set of 
theorems clearly cannot be an explanation for the puzzle, since, in the presence of taxes, 
they propose the firm to be financed solely with debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963). 
Moving onward, zero-leverage could possibly be justified with the Trade-off Theory. 
That is, when the company is already exploiting tax benefits through non-debt tax shields, 
such as depreciation and investment tax credits, resulting in limited benefit when adding 
debt. Also, if the firm is over-burdened with off-balance sheet liabilities the expected 
financial distress costs become too high when adding debt. So, by adding debt in these 
circumstances the expected marginal cost of debt would be higher than its benefits (Kraus 
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& Litzenberger, 1973). However, these situations are rare and do not explain all zero-
leverage cases, and therefore the Trade-off Theory does not fully explain the puzzle. 
The Pecking Order Theory holds when zero-leverage firms use internally generated 
funds to finance their investment opportunities. Nevertheless, zero-leverage goes against 
the pecking order in cases where companies issue equity as a source of financing although 
possessing debt capacity (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Thus, the pecking order does not 
universally apply either. 
Consistent with the Market Timing Theory, it is likely that firms with overvalued equity 
take advantage of that situation, and are therefore likely to become debt free, especially 
companies with a strong cash flow. However, companies that need external financing 
regularly are not likely to be constantly overvalued, and should therefore have at least 
some debt on their balance sheet (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Hence, again the Market 
Timing Theory cannot fully explain the puzzle, even though in some cases it might. In 
summary, capital structure theories cannot explain the zero-leverage puzzle entirely and 
therefore a need to search beyond the capital structure field arises.  
2.1.2 Agency problems 
Agency cost was first set forth by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. According to them, agency 
problems arise when there is a separation between ownership and control. Since rational 
agents are assumed to be utility maximizing, it is not certain that managers will always 
have the owners' best interest at heart. 
Agency problems affect the capital structure since it depends on the firm's 
characteristics if it needs more or less debt. Too much free cash flow, due to low or no 
debt, can tempt the manager to misuse the firm's resources (Jensen, 1986). On the other 
hand, if the company has too much debt it can result in, due to financial inflexibility, an 
underinvestment problem which is referred to as residual loss (Myers, 1977). 
Managers have substantial wealth and future income invested in the firm and they are 
thus considerably more undiversified than shareholders. Since debt makes the company's 
equity more risky, it is not surprising that managers opt for less debt than shareholders 
due to managerial risk aversion (Ju, Parrino, Poteshman & Weisbach, 2002).  
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2.1.2.1 Theoretical implications of agency problems regarding zero-leverage 
Agency problems may arise with zero-leverage if firms are exposed to the free cash flow 
problem since they do not pay any interests (Jensen, 1986). This problem could be 
alleviated by paying dividends. However, some companies prefer to be debt free and pay 
no dividends to mitigate the underinvestment problem, and to be able to exploit future 
investment opportunities without having to rely on external financing. Furthermore, if 
managers have substantial power over shareholders, for example when the ownership is 
highly distributed among many investors, then it is likely that managers can influence the 
capital structure in their favour, possibly explaining zero-leverage with that ownership 
structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ju et al., 2002; Myers, 1977). 
2.1.3 Ownership structure 
2.1.3.1 Diffuse ownership 
The first to identify the problematic nature of diffuse ownership were Berle and Means in 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932. They point out that in the presence 
of diffuse ownership each investor is too small to be incentivised to monitor the 
manager's behaviour. Since the managers interests are not perfectly aligned with that of 
shareholders, managers might be tempted to shirk. Rational small investors know that 
their independent actions will most likely not make a difference. This results in the well-
known free-rider problem where no investor performs the monitoring duties, leaving the 
manager both unconstrained and unsupervised. As the diffuseness of ownership 
increases, so does the free-rider problem. Even though there are obvious disadvantages to 
diffuse ownership, according to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), there must be some 
advantages weighing against them, since diffuse ownership is common. However, these 
advantages are not explicitly stated. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), on the other hand, state 
that the benefits of diffuse ownership are that it limits the costs resulting from 
concentrated ownership. 
2.1.3.2 Concentrated ownership 
Large shareholders, as opposed to small, have an incentive to monitor managers due to 
their large stake in the firm and therefore provide a partial solution to the free-rider 
problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, when ownership is concentrated 
reaching consensus is relatively uncomplicated resulting in a more efficient decision 
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making process. However, there are also costs associated with concentrated ownership. It 
can, for example, lead to decisions that do not coincide with small shareholders' interests, 
since large shareholders tend to represent their own interests. Andersson and Reeb (2003) 
identify the most common costs of concentrated ownership to be that large shareholders 
can expropriate or redistribute wealth through, for example, special dividends, excessive 
compensation packages, and risk avoidance. It is known that the identity of the owner in a 
concentrated ownership is important, since different types of investors have different 
preferences (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Two distinct categories of concentrated 
shareholders are large private investors and institutional investors. 
2.1.3.2.1 Large private investors 
The most prominent cost of large private investors is that they tend to be undiversified 
and thus bear excessive risk (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Due to their undiversified nature, 
large private investors have the incentive to reduce firm specific risk, and combined with 
the power resulting from their size, they usually can. This could potentially hurt minority 
shareholders that are fully diversified since they have accounted for firm specific risk in 
their portfolio (Culp, 2002). 
Family firms are a relatively well researched field and can be classified as large private 
investors. However, research in this field cannot generally be applied to large private 
investors since it is a narrower term. This is unfortunate since zero-leverage is known to 
be highly concentrated among family firms and therefore nothing can be inferred in this 
research about the relationship between family firms and zero-leverage (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). 
2.1.3.2.2 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors as opposed to large private shareholders are assumed to be well 
diversified and are thus not overly exposed to firm specific risk. When investigating 
institutional investors in 1988 Brickley, Lease and Smith found that institutional investors 
tend to vote with value increasing proposals, and against value destroying proposals, or 
sell if their opinions are not in line with that of management. Furthermore, monitoring 
costs are lower for institutional investors, since they have the expertise and coordination 
devices allowing them to aggregate ownership positions, and thereby resisting 
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opportunistic behaviour of management. Pound (1988) agrees that institutional investors 
have the motivation and the ability to monitor management but they identify a conflict of 
interest between the company and the institutional investors. This conflict of interest 
arises when the institution is more likely to vote with the management, though value 
decreasing, because of an existing business relation between the institution and the firm 
they do not want to jeopardize. However, due to increasing minority shareholder 
protection it is likely that this sort of behaviour is regulated in established markets.  
2.1.3.3 Theoretical implications of ownership regarding zero-leverage 
Diffuse ownership can lead to zero-leverage in cases where shareholders are powerless 
against the manager, who serves his own interest by reducing risk in the capital structure, 
due to the undiversified nature of his current and future wealth (Agrawal & Nagarajan, 
1990). 
Concentrated ownership should decrease the likelihood of firms adopting a zero-
leverage policy since it increases shareholders incentives to monitor managers’ behaviour, 
and thus reduces the free-rider problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
When researching the zero-leverage phenomenon the risk avoidance of large private 
undiversified shareholders is the most relevant cost of concentrated ownership. Due to 
their undiversified nature their future wealth depends disproportionally on the continuity 
of the firm, and so they might opt for the least risky capital structure form, zero-leverage, 
to reduce the probability of default (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
High institutional ownership should result in at least some debt in the capital structure 
since adding initial debt is value increasing, as it reduces the cost of capital, and when they 
have the power they oppose to opportunistic behaviour of managers such as pursuing low 
risk capital structure forms. This makes zero-leverage in firms with high institutional 
ownership unlikely (Brickley et al., 1988; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
2.2 Literature review on zero-leverage 
The zero-leverage phenomenon and debt conservatism has been addressed by several 
researchers, though under different titles and definitions. In the following section previous 
literature will be reviewed.  
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2.2.1 Managerial features and governance characteristics 
One strand of literature regarding the zero-leverage puzzle, and perhaps the most 
researched, is the one concerning managerial features and governance characteristics. 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) were the first to focus on zero-leverage in their working paper 
from 2006, which was later published in 2013. Their main focus was on internal 
governance, and to exclude financially constrained firms, since they may have adopted 
zero-leverage policy involuntarily, the researchers concentrated on firms who pay 
dividend. They found that firms with large CEO ownership, firms with small and less 
independent boards and family firms are more likely to follow a zero-leverage policy. If the 
CEO has a large ownership stake, then he has more formal power over the board and thus 
it is more likely that he can influence the capital structure decision. Furthermore, if the 
board is small and less independent it is more likely that board members reach consensus 
on unorthodox solutions in favour of the manager, like zero-leverage capital structure. 
Lastly, in the case of family firms, family members are likely to be undiversified and care 
about survival and legacy of the firm, and since debt increases risk and the probability of 
default, family firms are more likely to follow a zero-leverage policy. Devos et al. 
conducted a similar research in 2012 where they, however, focused on both internal and 
external governance mechanisms but they found contradicting results. Their findings 
suggested that the reason for zero-leverage is that firms are financially constrained. 
Furthermore, managerial entrenchment is not an explaining factor and governance 
structure is not weaker in firms with zero-leverage. Similar findings were reported by 
Byoun and Xu (2013). These results are perhaps not surprising since both do not filter out 
firms that are financially constrained, like Strebulaev and Yang, but include it as an 
explanatory variable. A large fraction of firms that follow a zero-leverage policy actually do 
so because they do not have a choice, firms with no debt capacity cannot lever up. Thus, 
in this paper financial constraints will be regarded as a control variable. 
2.2.2 Other firm characteristics 
Another strand of the literature tries to explain the zero-leverage puzzle with firm 
characteristics other than those discussed above. Dang (2013) researched companies in 
the UK and found that zero-leverage firms can be divided into two groups, one where the 
firms pay dividend and one where the firms do not. He discovers that non-dividend paying 
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firms have characteristics that generally characterise firms that are constrained. That 
includes, small growth firms young in age, negative profitability, and both low tangibility 
and Z-scores. Contrastingly, firms with higher dividend pay-out ratios, that are therefore 
unconstrained according to Dang, are older, profitable and larger in size. According to 
Dang (2013) constrained firms follow zero-leverage policy because of their limited 
exposure to the debt market, while unconstrained firms deliberately choose zero-leverage 
to mitigate the underinvestment problem and maintain financial flexibility for future 
investment opportunities. Bessler et al. researched zero-leverage companies around the 
world in 2013 and largely came to the same conclusion as Dang (2013) regarding firm 
characteristics. Finally, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) conduct a study on public nonfinancial 
US firms and come to the same conclusion as the two aforementioned studies when it 
comes to firm characteristics. Therefore, it can be concluded that firms that follow a zero-
leverage policy all have similar, if not the same, characteristics depending on their 
financial flexibility. 
2.2.3 Industry 
The articles discussed above all conclude that zero-leverage cannot be explained by 
industry alone since zero-leverage is apparent in most industries, though more in some 
than others. In these studies different industries are identified as having high 
concentration of zero-leverage firms. Dang (2013) and Bessler et al. (2013) report extreme 
debt conservatism in the energy-, technology- and healthcare industries, while Strebulaev 
and Yang (2013) only find high concentration in technology and healthcare. This is fairly 
intuitive since technology and healthcare are high growth industries with valuable growth 
opportunities. However, even though energy is not a high growth industry, energy 
companies, as well as companies from the other two industries generally hold high cash 
reserves reducing the incentive to borrow (Dang, 2013). 
2.2.4 Macroeconomic factors 
In 2013 Dang researched among other things, if macroeconomic conditions could affect 
firm's decision to have zero-leverage. In this purpose three macroeconomic variables were 
included in his model. The first being real GDP growth rate, where they expect leverage to 
decline with increasing GDP. Furthermore, they assume that this should have more effect 
on constrained firms than unconstrained. The second and third are the term structure of 
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interest rates and equity premium. When the term structure of interest rates expands the 
cost of borrowing increases compared to equity and therefore companies are likely to 
eschew debt. Concerning equity premium, Dang states that it has an ambiguous impact on 
the firm's capital structure and thus he does not interpret it further. His main conclusion is 
that zero-leverage decisions are significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions, 
especially for firms that are relatively unconstrained. 
2.2.5 Ownership structure 
Even though some researchers have researched ownership structure from many 
perspectives e.g. firm value (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; De Miguel, Pindado & De la Torre, 
2004; etc.), corporate governance (Brickley et al., 1988; Pound, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; etc.), performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), none have, to our knowledge, 
tested the relationship between ownership structure and the zero-leverage phenomenon. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
As discussed above researchers have not been able to fully explain why some firms adopt 
a zero-leverage policy. Therefore we will try an alternative approach, using ownership 
structure to see whether it explains the zero-leverage puzzle. Below, three hypotheses, 
derived from theory and previous literature, will be proposed. 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
H0: Companies with diffuse ownership are more likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-
leverage policy 
When ownership is diffuse no single investor is big enough to have the incentive to 
monitor the manager's behaviour. Therefore, due to agency problems and managerial risk 
aversion, we expect firms with diffuse ownership to be more likely to follow a zero- or 
almost zero-leverage policy. 
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
H0: Companies with concentrated ownership are less likely to follow a zero- or almost 
zero-leverage policy 
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When ownership is concentrated, zero- or almost zero-leverage is less likely, since large 
investors have more incentive to monitor, limiting the free-rider problem and therefore 
preventing managerial risk aversion. 
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
H0: Companies where the maximum voteholder is an institutional investor are less 
 likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy 
When ownership is concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, due to their 
diversified nature, value creating activities are supported while value decreasing activities 
are not. Therefore we expect zero- or almost zero-leverage to be less likely in firms where 
the maximum voteholder is an institutional investor.  
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3 Methodology  
In this chapter the methodological framework is introduced. The purpose is to provide 
transparency to the research design and make it replicable. The chapter starts off by 
introducing the data and sample along with the data collection process. Next, the variables 
are introduced, defined and explained. Additionally the regression model is introduced and 
its validity and reliability is discussed.  
3.1 Data and sample 
The initial sample consists of all listed firms in Sweden on all stock exchanges from the 
period 2000 to 2013. In this research two databases were used to gather the necessary 
data, Thomson Reuters Datastream, henceforth Datastream, to collect financial 
information on the sample firms and SIS Ägarservice (SIS) to gather ownership structure 
data on those firms. The aforementioned sample period was chosen since the majority of 
information could be extracted from both databases in this period, as SIS has limited data 
before 2000. 
SIS Ägarservice, which translates to SIS Ownership Service, was used to acquire 
ownership data on companies on all the Swedish stock exchanges. The database provides 
unique information on ownership and voting rights, for up to 200 largest share- and 
voteholders, not only on the large NASDAQ OMX exchange but also the smaller markets, 
NGM, First North and AktieTorget. However, information on the 50 largest share- and 
voteholders were only used since the rest only owns a negligible share. Furthermore, 
investors can be grouped into spheres and information about who are the 500 biggest 
institutional investors in Sweden is available. By grouping investors into spheres, such as 
families and other connected investors, it is easier to see who really controls the 
companies. This information is especially valuable for the research and makes it somewhat 
unique. 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm is the largest stock exchange in Sweden, with 267 companies 
listed. The stock exchange divides companies into three segments depending on their 
market value; Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap. Companies listed in this stock exchange 
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are more advanced compared to the other three markets (Corporate Actions Stockholm, 
n.d.). In the SIS database information is only available for 248 companies so 19 firms were 
lost there and additional 9 were eliminated since information in Datastream is not 
available. Thus, in total there are 239 companies from NASDAQ, with 2345 observations.  
First North, with 158 companies listed, is better suited for smaller and developing 
companies since rules and regulations are not as demanding and complex as on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm (Shares, n.d.). In the SIS database information is only available for 115 
companies so 35 firms were lost there and additional 8 were eliminated since information 
in Datastream is not available. Thus, in total there are 107 companies from First North, 
with 510 observations. 
Nordic Growth Market (NGM) is the smallest stock exchange in Sweden, with only 12 
listed companies. This market is intended for small and medium sized businesses though 
they are leading in exchange traded products, such as warrants, certificates and 
structured products (NGM, n.d.). In the SIS database information is only available for 10 
companies so 2 firms were lost there and additional 1 was eliminated since information in 
Datastream is not available. Thus, in total there are 9 companies from NGM, with 83 
observations. 
AktieTorget is different from the other three since it only exists in Sweden and 
exclusively lists Swedish firms, or 129. Resembling First North, companies listed on 
AktieTorget are either small or in their growing phase (AktieTorget, n.d.). In the SIS 
database information is only available for 94 companies so 35 firms were lost there and 
additional 38 were eliminated since information in Datastream is not available. Thus, in 
total there are 56 companies from AktieTorget, with 309 observations. The loss of 
observations from this market has a logical explanation. The companies are young, often 
less than a year old, and therefore it is not surprising that data is not available for these 
companies. 
In summary, the dataset is thus a panel including 411 companies that sums up to 3247 
observations over this 14 year period. Panel dataset can be either balanced or 
unbalanced, balanced if all firms have time series observations for the whole sample 
period and unbalanced if they do not (Brooks, 2008). In this research, not all the firms 
have observations for the whole period, and therefore the panel is unbalanced. 
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3.1.1 Data collecting procedures 
The first step in collecting and structuring the data involved collecting data from the SIS 
database on ownership structure. This involved creating one file for every firm and one 
sheet for each year within that file. Since this database does not deliver ready-to-use 
output, every sheet needed to be structured to fit so that a set of formulas could be 
applied to every single sheet. 
The second and the third step included extracting information on the 500 biggest 
institutional investors in Sweden from SIS and adding the necessary financial data from 
Datastream to every work file, each in a separate sheet. 
The fourth step was to make a sample sheet within in every work file that summarized 
the data needed from every year sheet. Therefore, the sample sheet now includes ready-
to-use variables from each year for the firm in question. The variables were constructed 
by using the formulas provided in chapter 3.2 Variables. 
The fifth step was to merge the sample sheets from all the firms into a single large 
panel, in a separate work file. This panel was then used to run the necessary tests in 
EViews. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
In the model used, one dependent variable will be tested. The dependent variable is 
binary and is a combination of two variables. The first is zero-leverage, defined as firms 
with no debt in their balance sheet, neither short nor long term. In Datastream we use the 
Worldscope codes to obtain values for our variables e.g. for total debt the code is 
WC03255 and for total book value of assets it is WC02999. 
The second is almost zero-leverage (AZL) and it will be defined as firms with book 
leverage lower than 5%. Excluding these firms from our research would be too strict since 
often financial liabilities are considered to be debt from an accounting stand point. 
𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
=
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
= 0 
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By summing them together we obtain value 1 for firms with book leverage lower than 
5% and 0 for the rest. The reason for initially separating them was to see how many firms 
have purely zero-leverage. Thus, the final dependent variable is as follows:  
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Three independent variables are of interest in this study. They all serve to explain different 
ownership structure characteristics. Below these independent variables are presented and 
explained. 
Diffuse ownership (Diffuseit): The proxy used for diffuse ownership is a binary variable 
taking the value one if the shareholder holding the maximum votes has less than 5% 
voting rights, meaning that no shareholder has more than 5% voting rights, and zero 
otherwise. In a firm that takes value one for this variable, ownership is diffuse. Even 
though in most cases continuous variable has more explanatory power, a binary variable is 
used since any summing of voting rights below 5% would not be logical. The 5% threshold 
is selected since research such as Brickley et al. (1988), Holderness (2009) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) use the same threshold to define concentrated ownership, which is the 
inverse of diffuse. 
Concentrated ownership (Concenit): The proxy used for concentrated ownership is a 
continuous variable representing sum of the voting rights of block holders owning more 
than 5% of outstanding voting rights. Similar variable was used in a study by Brickley et al. 
(1988), Devos et al. (2012) and Holderness (2009).  
Institutional investor (Instit): The proxy used for institutional investor with concentrated 
ownership is a dummy variable, taking the value one if the investor, or a sphere of 
investors, is institutional and zero otherwise. In the reference case, where the variable 
takes the value zero, the investor is private or a sphere of private investors. Similar 
variable was used by Anderson and Reeb (2003), Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and Thomsen 
and Pedersen (2000). 
𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
< 0,05 
𝑍𝐿/𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡  
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3.2.2.1 Control variables 
Capital structure has been widely researched throughout the years. The control variables 
used in this study are those that have gained general consensus in explaining capital 
structure in firms and are also considered to explain firm characteristics. There is no 
standard set of variables generally used and the number of variables varies between 
studies (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Below, the control variables used are listed and explained. 
Bankruptcy probability (Zit): Bankruptcy probability is used to address potential financial 
constraints of firms in the sample. It is more likely for firms with high probability of 
financial distress to have low debt levels in their capital structure, that is, companies with 
high operating risk are less likely to have debt in their capital structure. This suggests a 
negative relation between probability of default and debt (Marsh, 1982). 
In 1968, Altman created a ratio to determine the probability of default called the 
Altman Z-score. In 2002 he revisited this model and modified it, and it is used here as a 
proxy for bankruptcy probability like in other studies (Dang, 2013). The lower (higher) the 
score, the higher (lower) the probability of default:  
where, 
X1= Working Capital (WC03151) / Total Assets 
X2= Retained Earnings (WC03495) / Total Assets 
X3= EBIT (WC18191) / Total Assets 
X4= Market Capitalization (WC08001) / Total Liabilities (WC03351) 
X5= Sales (WC01001) / Total Assets 
Dividend payout ratio (Divit): Leverage should be lower in firms that pay dividends. 
According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms prefer internally generated funds over 
external financing and therefore firms would not maintain a high dividend payout ratio if 
they needed those funds for investments (Frank & Goyal, 2009). This has been shown in 
several research (Bessler et al., 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). Here, the dividend payout 
ratio is calculated by dividing cash dividend paid (WC04551) with total book value of 
assets:  
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 1,2𝑋1 + 1,4𝑋2 + 3,3𝑋3 + 0,6𝑋4 + 𝑋5 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Investment opportunities (MBit): Jensen (1986) states that firms with scarce investment 
opportunities carry less debt than others. Like many other researchers have done before, 
the market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for investment opportunities (Rajan & Zingales 
1995; Minton & Wruck, 2002). The ratio is calculated by dividing market value of equity, 
here using market capitalization, with its book value (WC03501). 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTSit): Non-debt tax shield is expected to be negatively related to 
debt since in the presence of high non-debt tax shield the tax benefits of adding additional 
debt are low, or nonexistent (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Brailsford, Oliver & Pua in 2002, 
use one single measure as a proxy for non-debt tax shield, annual depreciation expenses 
scaled by total assets. Titman and Wessels (1988), however, define non-debt tax shield 
with three different measures; investment tax credits (WC04101) over total assets, 
depreciation (WC01151) over total assets and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shield 
over total assets. For convenience, in this study, non-debt tax shield are proxied only by 
the former two and combined in a single measure.  
Profitability (Profitit): According to the Pecking Order Theory, profitability should be 
accompanied by low leverage, since profitable firms should have higher internal funds 
available (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The proxy for profitability is here obtained by dividing 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (WC18198) with total assets (Minton & 
Wruck, 2002; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013).  
Size: Leverage should increase with size, since larger firms are generally less likely to 
become bankrupt. Size is here determined as the natural logarithm of total book value of 
assets (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Brailsford et al., 2002; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
Tangibility (Tangiit): Tangibility is generally associated with higher leverage, since it is an 
indicator for the collateral available in the firm. Some research only use fixed assets 
(WC02501), but here property, plant and equipment (PP&E) are used as a proxy for fixed 
𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 & 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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𝐹 𝑧𝑖 =
1
1 + exp⁡ −𝑧𝑖 
 
assets and standardize by dividing with totals assets to facilitate cross-sectional 
comparison (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
3.2.2.2 Categorical variables 
In addition, two categorical variables will be included to account for cross-sectional 
differences within the sample. These are industry and stock exchanges. To include them in 
the regression, one category of each variable will be excluded to avoid the dummy 
variable trap. In doing so, the excluded variable becomes the reference case to which the 
others will be compared. Therefore, these two variables will only be examined in the 
univariate analysis.  
Industry: It has been shown that companies within certain industries have lower debt 
than others, and are therefore more likely to be zero- or almost zero-leveraged. This has 
been shown in several studies (Minton & Wruck, 2001; Bessler et al., 2013; Strebulaev & 
Yang, 2013). In all these research, SIC codes were used to divide companies between 
industries, but in this study the two-digit Industry Benchmark Classification (IBC) code is 
used to form a binary variable for each industry. 
Stock Exchange (Exchangeit): It may depend on the stock exchange whether firms have 
debt on their balance sheet, since it is more likely that less advanced firms, younger, 
smaller and with less tangibility, are listed on the smaller markets. A binary variable is 
introduced for each exchange. 
3.3 The regression model 
The logit model, which is used in the regression analysis, is a well-known type of limited 
dependent variable model, where the dependent variable is binary. It was chosen over the 
similar probit model, since it is more convenient and has been used in previous studies on 
zero-leverage (e.g. Strebulaev & Yang, 2013; Bessler et al., 2013). The logit model is similar 
to the OLS linear regression, although the assumptions of the model are different. The 
logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability distribution function, for any 
variable 𝑧  (Brooks, 2008): 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑃&𝐸
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Due to the non-linearity of the logit model, it uses the maximum likelihood method to 
estimate its parameters. Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficients is not as straight 
forward as in OLS. That is, one unit increase in the independent variable does not result in 
an increase/decrease in the dependent variable, corresponding to the value of the 
coefficient of the independent one. Instead, a one unit increase in the independent 
variable will cause an increase/decrease in the probability that the outcome of the 
dependent variable is one. These probabilities are obtained by calculating the marginal 
effects. However, calculating the marginal effects is not necessary for the purpose of this 
research, since only the sign and the significance levels of the parameters are of interest in 
this study, and therefore no further explanations on the marginal effects will be provided. 
Care needs to be taken when analysing the coefficients in the logit model. The sign on 
the coefficients can, however, be interpreted normally, a positive sign indicates an 
increase in the likelihood of zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage while a negative sign 
reduces it. Furthermore, the z-statistic and p-value still report significance. 
3.3.1 Empirical models 
In the following section three empirical models will be introduced. The control variable 
regression represents the base regression and in the three remaining regressions relevant 
variables are added to test the hypotheses of interest. 
3.3.1.1 Control variable model 
The following equation represents the control variable regression:  
Here β0 is a constant, pt represents the period fixed effects and  i,t represents the error 
term. Industry and Exchange represent set of categorical variables for the industries and 
the exchange respectively. To avoid the dummy variable trap one of each had to be 
omitted. The variables omitted become the reference case which the other variables in 
that category are compared to (Brooks, 2008). In this study, NASDAQ OMX and Industrials 
have been omitted since they are by far the largest variables in their category. The 
remaining variables have been explained in section 3.2.2.1 Control Variables. If the 
variables have been lagged the notation t-1 is added.  
𝑍𝐿/𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑡 +  𝑖 ,𝑡  
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3.3.1.2 Diffuse ownership model 
The following equation represents the regression that will be used to test hypothesis 1 
regarding diffuse ownership:  
Here, the same variables are used as in the control regression, except the variable 
Diffuse is added. Like stated above, ownership is diffuse if no shareholder, or group of 
shareholders, has more than 5% voting rights. The variable Diffuse is a binary, taking the 
value one if the ownership is diffuse, and zero otherwise.  
3.3.1.3 Concentrated ownership model 
The following equation represents the regression that will be used to test hypothesis 2 on 
the subject of concentrated ownership:  
Again, the control variable regression remains the base. Additionally, the variable 
Concen is included in the model, representing ownership concentration. Where, as 
mention earlier, ownership concentration is defined as the sum of voting rights of all 
shareholders with more than 5% voting rights.  
3.3.1.4 Institutional ownership model 
The following regression will be run to test hypothesis 3 regarding ownership 
concentration in the hands of institutional investors:  
Now, the concentrated ownership is extended to also include, Inst, for investor type. 
Inst is a binary variable taking the value one if the primary owner is an institution, and 
zero if he is private. 
3.4 Model validity and reliability 
It is of great concern that the data collection techniques and analysis is reliable. In this 
research secondary data was used, and since it may be gathered for a different purpose, it 
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presents a possibility that the data may be inaccurate (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). 
However, the databases used in this research, Datastream and SIS, are both considered 
reputable, and have been validated by other researchers, and therefore the data set used 
can be considered trustworthy. Furthermore, statistical software, EViews, was used to run 
the regressions and perform the necessary tests, leaving minor room for human error. 
However, when categorizing investors into spheres, the sphere name was not on the list 
of institutional investors, so the type of investors, private or institutional, had to be 
manually marked. It cannot be ruled out for certain that mistakes were made, but the 
procedure was repeated twice in effort to make sure nothing was overlooked.  
Another concern is the validity of the research. When variables are measuring what 
they should be measuring, and the results actually report what they appear to be 
reporting, then the model is considered to be valid (Saunders et al., 2009). The dependent 
variable, used in this research, is a binary variable, similar to those that have been used in 
most research on zero-leverage. Furthermore, the control variables are those generally 
used to explain capital structure. It can therefore be concluded that these variables are 
highly valid. However, since a research of this type has not been conducted before, the 
validity of the ownership structure variables may be called into question, even though 
they have been used in different studies. 
To ensure validity and reliability, the following robustness tests were conducted, and 
the relevant measures taken, to improve the model.  
3.4.1 Goodness of fit 
McFadden R squared is an indicator of how well specified the model is. This measure is 
similar to R squared in OLS regression, but the difference is that it does not report as high 
values, but the same logic applies, the higher the better. The McFadden R squared for the 
models in this study, is approximately 0,3, meaning that the models have a relatively good 
fit. Furthermore, when generating the percentage of correct predictions the models 
deliver a value around 78%, indicating again that these models are a good fit (see table 21 
in appendix B) (Brooks, 2008). 
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3.4.2 Autocorrelation 
When observations are collected over time, such as in time series data, the observations 
are not always random, but correlated over time, this is called autocorrelation. Since panel 
data is made up from time series and cross sectional data, autocorrelation may be 
present. If autocorrelation is present, it may cause erroneous inference of the coefficients. 
Ljung Box Q-statistics can be used to detect autocorrelation in EViews. When running the 
model, without lagging the independent variables, the Q-statistic reports no 
autocorrelation (see table 22 in appendix B).  
3.4.3 Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is common in limited dependent model such as logit. It is present when 
the residuals are correlated with the independent variables. Heteroscedasticity can make 
the inference misleading, since the standard errors are inaccurate. No built-in test exists in 
EViews for heteroscedasticity when using panel data, but with an OLS model it is possible 
to conduct a manual Breusch-Pagan test. Since the test involves regressing the 
explanatory variables against the squared residuals, it is not possible to conduct when 
using a logit model, because the squared residuals are not binary. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to ensure that the standard error estimates are robust, by making the 
covariances robust with the Huber/White function in EViews. Thus, that option is selected 
for all the models to take care of potential heteroscedasticity problems (Brooks, 2008).  
3.4.4 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is when the independent variables are excessively correlated with one 
another. This can be a problem since having collinear variables in a regression can make 
the conclusion of the model imprecise and therefore makes it difficult to draw inference. 
Multicollinearity is often identified with correlation matrices, since doing a proper test is a 
wearisome task (Brooks, 2008). 
When making correlation matrix for all the independent variables together, none of the 
variables have more than 0,8 correlation with each other, indicating no multicollinearity 
problems (Brooks, 2008). This can be seen in table 23 in appendix B. Furthermore, panel 
data helps alleviate multicollinearity problems, so even if high correlation was present, it 
would not be considered problematic (Brooks, 2008). 
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3.4.5 Winsorizing of outliers 
The variables with extreme outliers were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. This 
procedure transforms outliers in these percentiles to be equal to the value corresponding 
to these percentiles. This procedure was performed since extreme outliers can greatly 
increase the variance of a variable, and can therefore affect the significance level (Brooks, 
2008). 
3.4.6 Endogeneity 
When there is correlation between independent variables and the error term, an 
endogeneity problem arises. When endogeneity is present in a model, it may result in 
biased and inconsistent coefficients, and therefore, it is important to control for it. Using 
panel data models, like fixed effects or random effects, can decrease the endogeneity 
problem. There are two ways of dealing with endogeneity in the cross section and period 
dimension with the fixed effect model, either using the least square dummy variables 
(LSDV) or the within transformation. The within transformation is preferred, since it is 
more efficient than the LSDV. It saves degrees of freedom by demeaning the variables 
instead of adding a dummy variable for each unit (Brooks, 2008). 
The logit model, used in this study, is incompatible with panel data models in EViews 
and therefore, these models cannot be used to address the endogeneity problem. 
However, fixed effects can be thought of as having a dummy variable for each dimension, 
cross sectional, period or both. Therefore, including dummy variables in our regression 
can improve the model. In this study, the cross section consists of 411 firms and adding a 
dummy variable for each firm, to account for cross sectional fixed effects, would severely 
reduce the number of degrees of freedom, and thereby affect the precision of the model. 
Instead, the industry dummy variables are used to account for cross sectional differences, 
and period fixed effects dummies are added as well to reduce the endogeneity problem. 
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4 Univariate analysis 
In this chapter the univariate analysis is presented. The chapter starts with descriptive 
statistics. Then it is verified whether or not the zero-leverage phenomenon exists in the 
Swedish market, potential financial constraints are addressed, and the Swedish ownership 
structure is analysed.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In table 1 the descriptive statistics are presented. Since variables with outliers have been 
winsorised, both the mean and the median are reliable. Since majority of the variables in 
the model are categorical binary variables, their standard deviations represent the 
proportion of firms belonging to that category. The standard deviations on the remaining 
variables seem rather reasonable except for the bankruptcy probability and concentrated 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations
Zero-leverage/Almost zero-leverage 0,34 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,47 2977
Bankruptcy probability 5,58 2,94 80,19 -13,05 11,45 2977
Dividends 0,02 0,01 0,23 0,00 0,04 2977
Investment opportunities 3,03 1,83 25,00 0,25 3,74 2977
Non-debt tax shield 0,04 0,03 0,27 0,00 0,04 2977
Profitability 0,02 0,09 0,46 -1,28 0,26 2977
Size 5,91 5,82 9,81 2,74 1,10 2977
Tangibility 0,19 0,08 1,00 -0,07 0,25 2977
AktieTorget 0,08 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,27 2977
First North 0,14 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,35 2977
NGM 0,03 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,16 2977
NASDAQ OMX 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,43 2977
Basic Materials 0,06 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,24 2977
Consumer Goods 0,08 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,26 2977
Consumer Services 0,11 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,31 2977
Financials 0,15 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,35 2977
Health Care 0,12 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,33 2977
Industrials 0,29 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,46 2977
Oil & Gas 0,03 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,17 2977
Technology 0,14 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,35 2977
Telecommunications 0,01 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,12 2977
Utilities 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,07 2977
Concentrated Ownership 49,41 50,70 90,60 0,00 21,58 2977
Institutional Investor 0,39 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,49 2977
Diffuse Ownership 0,01 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,12 2977
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
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ownership. The high standard deviation on concentrated ownership is not considered 
problematic, since other researchers using this variable report a similar value (Devos et al., 
2012; Earle, Kucsera & Telegdy, 2005). Furthermore, the high standard deviation on 
bankruptcy probability is not perplexing since the proxy, Z-score, can vary greatly between 
firms, especially since the sample includes a broad variety of firms in all four exchanges in 
Sweden. To make sure this variable is not problematic, the regressions in the multivariate 
analysis were ran without this variable, and it did not affect the results. 
4.2 Zero-leverage in Sweden 
Using a pivot table zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage observations for each year, 
market and industry are extracted. When reviewing the data from the Swedish market, as 
presented in table 2, it is clear that the zero-leverage phenomenon is present in the 
market. Out of the 3247 observations, 22% report zero-leverage and 13% report almost 
zero-leverage. So jointly 35% of the observations, or 1151, have zero- or almost zero-
leverage.  
When looking at zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage observations in table 2 each 
year as a percentage of the total observations, it seems like the phenomenon is increasing 
over the sample period. However, when examining the zero- and almost zero-leverage 
observations, each year as a percentage of each year's total observations, the percentage 
is fairly stable over time. Therefore, it can be concluded that the zero-leverage is a 
substantial and persistent phenomenon in the Swedish stock market (See figure 1). 
Table 2: Zero-leverage in Sweden by year 
Year Observations # of obs % of total % of year # of obs % of total % of year # of obs % of total % of year
2000 76 16 0,5% 21,1% 10 0,3% 13,2% 26 0,8% 34,2%
2001 107 16 0,5% 15,0% 21 0,6% 19,6% 37 1,1% 34,6%
2002 118 16 0,5% 13,6% 23 0,7% 19,5% 39 1,2% 33,1%
2003 122 20 0,6% 16,4% 24 0,7% 19,7% 44 1,4% 36,1%
2004 128 22 0,7% 17,2% 21 0,6% 16,4% 43 1,3% 33,6%
2005 147 30 0,9% 20,4% 21 0,6% 14,3% 51 1,6% 34,7%
2006 172 37 1,1% 21,5% 26 0,8% 15,1% 63 1,9% 36,6%
2007 200 42 1,3% 21,0% 22 0,7% 11,0% 64 2,0% 32,0%
2008 319 84 2,6% 26,3% 30 0,9% 9,4% 114 3,5% 35,7%
2009 340 81 2,5% 23,8% 42 1,3% 12,4% 123 3,8% 36,2%
2010 360 80 2,5% 22,2% 53 1,6% 14,7% 133 4,1% 36,9%
2011 380 83 2,6% 21,8% 49 1,5% 12,9% 132 4,1% 34,7%
2012 388 97 3,0% 25,0% 42 1,3% 10,8% 139 4,3% 35,8%
2013 390 92 2,8% 23,6% 51 1,6% 13,1% 143 4,4% 36,7%
Total 3247 716 22% 435 13% 1151 35%
ZL AZL ZL / AZL
 39 
In a research conducted by Bessler et al. (2013) on all industrial firms in twenty 
different countries, they report mixed results on the percentage of zero-leverage firms in 
each country. The Scandinavian countries; Denmark, Finland and Norway, that are 
comparable to Sweden, report 8,13%, 16,94% and 3,7% zero-leverage firms, respectively. 
The reason why Sweden reportedly has greater percentage may be that Bessler et al. 
(2013) use a longer time period, or 1988 to 2011, and their research is only conducted on 
industrial firms. Furthermore, in this study on the Swedish market, smaller exchanges are 
also researched and they report relatively higher percentage of zero-leverage firms 
compared to the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Due to its size, OMX has the largest 
percentage of both zero-leverage firms of total observations, or 12,4%, and 56,4% of zero-
leverage firms on the market. However, observing the percentage of zero-leverage firms 
on each market separately, OMX has the lowest, or 17,2%. This can be seen in the last 
column in table 3, and was expected since firms in the smaller stock exchanges are usually 
younger, smaller in size, and are less profitable, and are therefore possibly constrained in 
their debt capacity.  
Figure 1: Zero-leverage in Sweden by year 
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Table 3: Zero-leverage by market 
Market Observations Size # of obs % of total % on market of total % of ZL on market
NASDAQ OMX 2345 72,2% 404 12,4% 56,4% 17,2%
First North 510 15,7% 161 5,0% 22,5% 31,6%
NGM 83 2,6% 29 0,9% 4,1% 34,9%
AktieTorget 309 9,5% 122 3,8% 17,0% 39,5%
Total 3247 100,0% 716 22% 100%
ZL
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When looking at how zero- and almost zero-leverage firms are distributed among 
industries, it can be seen that firms within the technology, health care and oil and gas 
industries have higher percentage of zero- and almost zero-leverage firms, or 64,1%, 
54,1%, 40,2%, respectively (See table 4 below and figure 2 in appendix B). This is 
consistent with Bessler et al. (2013), Dang (2013) and Strebulaev and Yang (2013), though 
in the last zero-leverage is only concentrated in technology and health care, but this 
difference may be due to different industry classifications. There may be a reason why 
these industries seem to have a higher percentage of zero-leverage firms. Again, the 
reason may be that companies in these industries have attributes that usually characterise 
firms that are constrained in their debt capacity. Furthermore, assets in these industries 
are usually more volatile and illiquid and thus do not serve as a good collateral (Bessler et 
al., 2013).  
4.3 Characteristics of firms in Sweden 
In this section the characteristics of firms that hold zero- or almost-zero leverage are 
compared to those that are levered. In this research the variables that explain firm 
characteristics are regarded as control variables.  
Table 4: Zero-leverage by industry 
Industry Observation # of obs % of total % in industry of total % of ZL/AZL in industry
Oil & Gas 112 45 1,4% 3,9% 40,2%
Basic Materials 206 51 1,6% 4,4% 24,8%
Industrials 922 225 6,9% 19,5% 24,4%
Consumer Goods 240 54 1,7% 4,7% 22,5%
Consumer Services 395 135 4,2% 11,7% 34,2%
Health Care 353 191 5,9% 16,6% 54,1%
Telecommunications 43 10 0,3% 0,9% 23,3%
Utilities 14 5 0,2% 0,4% 35,7%
Financials 514 148 4,6% 12,9% 28,8%
Technology 448 287 8,8% 24,9% 64,1%
Total 3247 1151 35% 100%
ZL / AZL
Table 5: Characteristics of levered and un-levered firms 
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In table 5 the comparison of the two groups of firms is presented. On average, zero- 
and almost zero-leverage firms are smaller, have lower probability of becoming bankrupt, 
lower tangibility and profitability, have greater investment opportunities, higher non-debt 
tax shield, and pay higher dividends than their levered counterparts. Largely these results 
are comparable to theory, except investment opportunities and profitability. Investment 
opportunities should be greater for levered firms since internally generated funds are 
usually not sufficient when firms have substantial investment opportunities, and if firms 
issue equity to fund their investments they are violating the Pecking Order Theory. 
Profitability is not in line with theory either, since it is expected that firms with high 
profitability have higher internally generated funds. However, it is possible to report 
profits without having positive cash flow, so these two do not always go hand in hand.  
Furthermore, these results are largely comparable to previous literature, such as Dang 
(2013) and Strebulaev and Yang (2013), even though there are some deviations. According 
to Strebulaev and Yang (2013) there is no difference between the two groups of firms in 
size, but profitability is higher for firms following a zero-leverage policy. In the research 
conducted by Dang (2013) dividends are lower on average in firms with zero-leverage.  
4.3.1 Are zero-leverage firms constrained?  
Most researchers studying the zero-leverage puzzle have addressed the fact that some 
firms following a zero-leverage policy may be doing so involuntarily. That is, for one 
reason or another they may not be able to obtain debt financing even though they would 
prefer to do so. Some researchers simply control for financial constraints by adding 
proxies for them to their regression analysis (Byoun & Xu, 2013; Devos et al., 2012), while 
others have dealt with the problem by dividing firms into two groups depending on 
whether they are constrained or not (Dang, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). Both Dang 
(2013) and Strebulaev and Yang (2013) divide firms into dividend payers and non-payers. 
They argue that zero-leverage dividend paying firms are not financially constrained since 
they use funds that otherwise could be used to service interest payments to compensate 
shareholders. According to this ideology, dividend paying zero-leverage firms are opting 
for zero-leverage for strategic reasons. Others, such as Bessler et al. (2013), use measures 
like S-A index and debt capacity to divide these firms into two groups. Making these 
measures, however, is more complicated. Furthermore, it has been shown by Farre-Mensa 
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and Ljungqvist (2013) that none of these measures can estimate with high accuracy which 
firms are constrained, and which are not. In this research, bankruptcy probability is 
included to account for potential financial constraints. In addition, the simple dividend 
paying approach will be conducted to confirm the results, and it will be presented in the 
multivariate analysis chapter.  
When looking at the Swedish market as a whole, and using dividends to distinguish 
between constrained and unconstrained firms, it can be seen that 41,7% of zero- or 
almost zero-leverage firms seem to have adopted zero-leverage policy voluntarily since 
they are paying dividends. This can be observed in table 6. Moreover, when the market is 
broken down into different stock exchanges, it becomes clear that the smaller exchanges 
are more constrained in their debt capacity than NASDAQ OMX, as expected.  
Furthermore, zero- and almost zero-leverage firms are divided into dividend payers and 
non-dividend payers to see whether the characteristics of the dividend paying group are in 
fact the same as the characteristics of unconstrained firms in previous studies. (Table 15 in 
appendix A reports characteristics on the two groups by market). 
As can be seen from table 7 dividend paying zero- and almost zero-leverage firms are 
by average larger, have higher dividend paying ratios, tangibility and profitability, have 
Table 6: Dividend paying firms 
Market Observations # of DP obs % of DP on market # of obs # of DP obs % of DP on market
NASDAQ OMX 2345 1488 63,5% 710 370 52,1%
First North 510 108 21,2% 215 68 31,6%
NGM 83 5 6,0% 44 2 4,5%
AktieTorget 309 62 20,1% 182 40 22,0%
Total 3247 1663 51,2% 1151 480 41,7%
ZL/AZL
Table 7: Characteristics of zero-leverage dividend and non-dividend paying firms 
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lower non-debt tax shields and investment opportunities and greater probability of 
becoming bankrupt than firms that do not pay dividends. These results are to a large 
extent in line with those of Strebulaev and Yang (2013), Dang (2013) and Bessler et al. 
(2013). However, bankruptcy probability is not according to expectations. Theory predicts 
that it should be analogous to the research by Dang (2013) where bankruptcy probability, 
proxied by Z-score, is lower for non-dividend paying firms. The reason for this deviation in 
the bankruptcy probability could be that firms on the Swedish market have a higher 
dividend pay-out ratio than firms in the UK (Dang, 2013). Retained earnings decrease 
when dividends are paid and the Z-score decreases with it since this measure is comprised 
of retained earnings. Typical unconstrained firms are more profitable, distribute higher 
dividends, are larger, and with greater tangibility, as well as having lower investment 
opportunities than their constrained peers (Bessler et al., 2013). Since the dividend paying 
zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage firms in Sweden possess these characteristics it is 
concluded that there are two groups of zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage firms, 
constrained and unconstrained, depending on their dividend paying nature. As stated 
earlier Bessler et al. (2013) use a more complicated measures to divide firms into 
constrained and unconstrained firms but seeing that it results in the same characteristics 
it justifies the use of this simple method. To summarize, it appears that dividend paying 
firms are deliberately remaining debt free while firms that do not pay dividends are forced 
to adopt a zero-leverage policy. 
4.4 Ownership structure in Sweden 
Ownership structure in Sweden is known to be concentrated, and that fact is evident 
when the data from the Swedish market is reviewed (Agnblad et al., 2002). In table 8 it 
can be seen that the average sum of voting rights of the block holders is 49,06%, and the 
concentration is similar among the four exchanges. Unfortunately, no direct comparison 
was found for the Swedish market with the same variable for ownership concentration but 
research from other civil law countries show even more ownership concentration or 
64,31% in Spain (De Miguel et al., 2004), a French civil law country and 60,9% in Hungary 
(Earle,  et al., 2005), a German civil law country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 
2007). However, when the result from the Swedish market is compared to research in 
common law countries that study ownership structure, the numbers are lower, or 43% in 
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a study with data from 1995 by Holderness (2009), and 38,17% in a study with data from 
2008 by Devos et al. (2012). The reason for the lower concentration may be that common 
law legal systems have greater investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
when separating institutional and private ownership with respect to the largest 
voteholder there is a notable difference where the average ownership of the block is 
larger when the largest owner is private. The difference between the ownership types 
increases in the smaller markets where private investors dominate. This indicates more 
ownership concentration when the largest investor is private. 
The average of the sum of voting rights of block holders in zero-leverage and almost-
zero leverage firms does not differ greatly from the average of the whole sample, and 
neither does owner identity (see table 9). This analysis is largely inconclusive since it is 
difficult to detect a clear difference in concentration between the zero-leverage and 
almost zero-leverage firms and the whole sample.  
It is apparent from table 10 that there are very few firms in the Swedish market that 
have diffuse ownership structure, or only 1,39% of firms observations aggregated over all  
four markets. This was expected due to the relatively low investor protection within in the 
Swedish market (La Porta et al., 2000). However, when looking at how many of the diffuse 
firm observations are also zero- or almost zero-leveraged, the percentage, 48,89%, is 
Table 8: Average voting rights of block holders 
Table 9: Average voting rights of the largest owner in ZL/AZL firms 
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striking. Therefore, a relation between diffuseness and zero- and almost zero-leverage 
policies seems to be present in the Swedish market.  
 
 
 
Table 10: Diffuse ownership in Sweden 
Market Observations Diffuse ownership 5% obs % of total Diffuse 5% obs % of Diffuse ZL
OMX 2345 26 1,11% 8 30,77%
First North 510 15 2,94% 10 66,67%
NGM 83 0 0,00% 0 -
AktieTorget 309 4 1,29% 4 100,00%
Total 3247 45 1,39% 22 48,89%
ZL/AZL
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5 Multivariate analysis 
In this chapter the multivariate analysis is reported. It starts by presenting the empirical 
results, followed by an analysis and discussion. Then, the robustness of the results is 
tested, and finally the research question is answered. 
5.1 Empirical results 
In the following section the results from the empirical models will be presented. 
5.1.1 Control variable regression 
Four of the control variables in table 11 are significant and in line with theory, these are 
dividends, investment opportunities, size and tangibility. The coefficient on dividends is 
positive, so when dividends increase the probability of zero- and almost zero-leverage 
increases as well. The proxy for investment opportunities, market-to-book, has a negative 
coefficient so when firms have more investment opportunities it is less likely that they 
hold zero- or almost zero-leverage. The coefficient on size is also negative, meaning that 
when firms grow, it is less likely that they will have zero- or almost zero-leverage. Finally, 
Table 11: Control variable regression 
***, ** and * stand for statistical significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% percentile except Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. For the three 
categorical variables one dummy variable of each is excluded to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ 
OMX, industrials and the year 2000.  
Expected Reality St.dv. Coefficient
Bankruptcy probability - + 0,016 0,085***
Dividends + + 1,535 10,119***
Investment opportunities - - 0,018  -0,033*
Non-debt tax shield + - 1,417  -3,413**
Profitability + - 0,252  -0,472*
Size - - 0,086  -0,976***
Tangibility - - 0,461  -3,311***
Constant 0,599 4,853***
Exchanges
Industries
Period
McFadden R-squared
Observations
Yes
Yes
0,306
2597
Yes
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the proxy for tangibility has a negative coefficient, meaning that when firms have greater 
tangibility they are less likely to have zero- or almost zero-leverage.  
The remaining three variables are significant but not in line with theory, these are 
bankruptcy probability, non-debt tax shield, and profitability. The coefficient on the proxy 
for bankruptcy probability, Z-score, is positive, meaning that when the probability of 
bankruptcy decreases the probability of zero- and almost zero-leverage increases. The 
coefficient on non-debt tax shield is negative, meaning that when NDTS increases the 
probability of zero- and almost zero-leverage decreases, which is not consistent with 
theory. The coefficient on profitability is negative, contradicting theory, since profitable 
firms should have higher internal funds available and therefore should not require debt 
financing.  
Furthermore, a Wald test is conducted for each of the categorical variables; exchanges, 
industries and periods. The coefficients on exchanges and industries are jointly significant 
as expected from the univariate analysis where there was a clear clustering of zero-
leverage and almost zero-leverage firms within certain industries and exchanges. 
However, the coefficients on the year dummies were not jointly significant, as could have 
been predicted from the univariate analysis, as it showed that zero- and almost zero-
leverage is persistent and consistent over time. To adhere to convention, the period fixed 
effects are not excluded despite their insignificance.  
Based on the above analysis on the control variables, it can be concluded that the 
underlying model used to control for capital structure decisions is valid. In addition, it 
shows that these capital structure variables that are used in international context also 
hold for the Swedish market.  
5.1.2 Diffuse ownership regression  
As can be seen in column one in table 12, the diffuse ownership variable is significant at 
the 10% level. The coefficient is positive, as expected, and therefore the likelihood of firm 
having a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy is greater since diffuse ownership gives 
managers more room to shirk. The coefficients and significance levels of the control 
variables vary only marginally from the previous control variable regression and are thus 
not reported. Since the 5% threshold could be considered too severe, another variable 
was constructed and tested. This variable is similar to the one used before, the only 
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difference being that the threshold defining diffuse ownership was moved up to 10%. 
Now, firms in which the largest shareholder holds less than 10% of voting rights are 
considered diffuse, resulting in more observations taking the value one for this variable 
than before. When testing this variable the significance level increases to 1% as opposed 
to 10% for the original variable.  
Furthermore, when the fixed effects are excluded one at a time, as can been seen in 
columns three and four, the results still hold. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
diffuse ownership measure is consistent and that hypothesis one is not rejected.  
H0: Companies with diffuse ownership are more likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-
leverage 
5.1.3 Concentrated ownership regression 
As can be seen from column one in table 13 the concentrated ownership variable is highly 
significant. The coefficient is negative, indicating that when ownership concentration 
increases the probability of zero- and almost zero-leverage decreases. This is in line with 
theory and previous literature, since concentrated ownership increases investors' 
Table 12: Diffuse ownership regression 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile 
except Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. For the three categorical variables one 
dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and 
the year 2000. 
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incentive to monitor and therefore limits managers’ possibility to misbehave. The 
coefficients and significance levels of the control variables are not reported since they vary 
only marginally from the previous control variable regression, with the exception of 
profitability that loses its significance. As with the diffuse ownership variable a 5% 
threshold may be considered too low since it includes too many firm observations. To 
address this concern, an additional variable is constructed and tested. The new variable is 
constructed the same way as the current concentrated ownership variable except the 
threshold for block ownership has been raised to 10%. Despite this change in the variable, 
it is still highly significant.  
Furthermore, when the fixed effects are excluded one at a time, as can been seen in 
column three and four, the results still hold. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
concentrated ownership measure is consistent and that hypothesis two is not rejected. 
H0: Companies with concentrated ownership are less likely to follow a zero- or almost 
zero-leverage 
 
Table 13: Concentrated ownership regression 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile 
except Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. For the three categorical variables one 
dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and 
the year 2000. 
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5.1.4 Institutional ownership regression  
The variable for institutional ownership is insignificant, even though it has the expected 
negative sign at all conventional significance levels. However, the variable for 
concentrated ownership is still highly significant. Therefore, it seems that owner identity 
does not influence zero- and almost zero-leverage decisions. The coefficients and 
significance levels of the control variables are not reported since they vary only marginally 
from the previous control variable regression, with the exception of profitability that loses 
its significance. The variable for institutional investor is indisputable, since it is not a proxy 
but a real measure of whether or not the maximum owner is an institution, and therefore 
it is neither possible nor necessary to find a broader measure to test its consistency. 
Furthermore, when the period and industry fixed effects are excluded, as can be seen in 
Table 14: Institutional ownership regression 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile except 
Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. For the three categorical variables one dummy 
variable is excluded from each to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and the year 
2000. 
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column three and four in table 14, the results still hold. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that hypothesis three is rejected.   
H0: Companies where the maximum voteholder is an institutional investor are less 
 likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy 
As mentioned earlier, in this research there are only two categories for investors, 
institutional and private. If an investor is not institutional, he is private. Therefore, the 
relationship between private investors and zero- and almost zero-leverage should be 
inverse to the same relationship for institutional investors. In fact, if the institutional 
ownership variable is switched out for a dummy variable representing private ownership 
instead, the results are exactly the same but with an opposite sign on the coefficient. 
5.2 Analysis and discussion 
In this section the empirical results from the multivariate regressions will be analysed, 
discussed, and compared to the univariate analysis.  
5.2.1 Discussion on control variables 
In the regressions, presented in 5.1 Empirical results, the bankruptcy probability is 
expected to have a negative coefficient, meaning that when the Z-score increases 
(bankruptcy probability decreases) the probability of a firm being zero- or almost zero-
leverage decreases. This is expected since this measure is used to account for financial 
constraints and when a firm has high operating risk, like the zero- and almost zero-
leverage firms are expected to be, the debt level should be low. However, the coefficient 
turns out to be positive in the multivariate regressions, opposite to prediction. This 
contrast between expectation and reality may be attributed to the proxy itself, since one 
component of the Z-score divides by total liabilities, and in the case of zero- and almost 
zero-leverage firms, liabilities are likely to be zero as well. Since it is not possible to divide 
by zero, these observations are lost, resulting in an upwardly biased Z-score. Due to the 
inaccuracy in this measure, it is possible that it is not accounting for financial constraints 
as initially was anticipated. However, even though they contradict theory, these results 
are in line with that of Dang (2013), who reports no explanations of his contradicting 
findings. 
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The coefficient on the dividend pay-out ratio is positive as expected and in line with 
previous research, that is, when the dividend pay-out ratio increases, the probability of 
zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage increases as well (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013; 
Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). This was anticipated since firms that pay dividends would not 
do so if they needed those funds for investments, since using internally generated funds 
to pay dividends while requiring debt financing for investments, violates the Pecking Order 
Theory.  
The probability of zero- or almost zero-leverage decreases with greater investment 
opportunities since investments often need to be financed with debt. Therefore, the 
coefficient on investment opportunities, proxied by market-to-book, is expected to be 
negative. This is the case in all the multivariate regressions, and contradicts results from 
previous research by Bessler et al. (2013), and Strebulaev and Yang (2013), but they do not 
comment on the validity of their results. 
Non-debt tax shields are expected to be positively related to zero-leverage and almost 
zero-leverage policies. If firms enjoy tax shields from other sources than debt then there is 
no incentive to add debt to the capital structure. However, the coefficient from the 
multivariate regressions is negative. The reason may be that this proxy depends on both 
depreciation and deferred income taxes and investment tax credits. Nevertheless, 
deferred income taxes and investment tax credits are rarely reported, and zero-leverage 
and almost zero-leverage firms tend to have less fixed assets so the tax shield from 
depreciation is lower for these firms. Therefore, the non-debt tax shield mainly consists of 
depreciation which is lower for zero- and almost zero-leverage firms. Moreover, this is not 
the only research reporting the unexpected negative sign since both Bessler et al. (2013) 
and Dang (2013) report the same.  
The coefficient on profitability is expected to be positive since greater profitability 
should generate internal funds and thus reduce the need for debt financing. That is, when 
profitability increases, the likelihood of a firm being zero- or almost zero-leveraged 
increases as well. This relationship has been found in previous research (Bessler et al., 
2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). In the multivariate regressions, however, the coefficient 
is negative. This is perhaps not unexplainable since in reality cash flows do not always 
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match profits and firms may need external financing even though they are highly 
profitable.  
If companies grow, the probability of a firm being zero-leveraged or almost zero-
leveraged decreases since then the likelihood of becoming bankrupt decreases so debt 
financing should be less expensive. This implies a negative coefficient on the size variable 
which is the case in all the multivariate regressions. These results are in line with previous 
research (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
Increasing tangibility decreases the probability of a firm being zero- or almost zero-
leveraged. If the amount of fixed assets, which can serve as collateral, increases so does 
the probability of being levered. The multivariate regressions report a negative coefficient 
on this variable, as expected, and is in line with previous research (Bessler et al., 2013; 
Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
The results from the above multivariate regression on the control variables are largely 
consistent with the univariate analysis with two exceptions. From the univariate analysis 
there was evidence that zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage firms had greater 
investment opportunities than their levered peers. The multivariate analysis, however, 
reveals that with increasing investment opportunities the probability of being zero- or 
almost zero-leveraged decrease, which is in line with theory. Furthermore, the non-debt 
tax shield changes from being in line with theory in the univariate analysis, and becomes 
theoretically incorrect in the multivariate analysis. However, as stated above, this is not an 
uncommon result.  
5.2.2 Discussion on ownership structure 
The coefficient on the diffuse ownership structure variable is positive, as expected, since 
according to theory, if ownership is diffuse managers have excessive power due to the 
limited monitoring caused by the free-rider problem. Therefore, if the ownership structure 
becomes more diffuse, the probability of a firm being zero- or almost zero-leveraged 
increases since a risk-averse manager is expected to take advantage of his power and limit 
the risk in the capital structure by reducing, or even eliminating debt. In the multivariate 
analysis the diffuse ownership structure variable is significant at the 10% significance level. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis one is not rejected and Swedish companies 
with diffuse ownership are more likely to follow a zero-leverage or almost zero-leverage 
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policy. However, since the variable is only significant at the 10% significance level, there is 
only weak evidence supporting the null hypothesis, suggesting that it may not be generally 
applicable.  
If a company’s ownership concentration increases the probability of a firm being zero- 
or almost zero-leveraged decreases. The reason is that when investors own a greater 
stake in a firm, and thus have more wealth invested, they have greater incentives to 
monitor managers. By monitoring, managers are encouraged to act in investors’ best 
interest. This suggests a negative coefficient on the concentrated ownership structure 
variable. The multivariate analysis reports this expected negative relationship at the 1% 
significance level between concentrated ownership structure and zero- and almost zero-
leverage. It can thus be concluded that Swedish companies with concentrated ownership 
are less likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy.  
In a research conducted by Devos et al. (2012) on management entrenchment in zero-
leverage firms, 5% block ownership was one of the variables used as a proxy for external 
governance. In their research, no significant relationship was found between this variable 
and zero-leverage policy in firms. This proxy for external governance is the same as the 
measure used in this study for concentrated ownership, which enables comparison. The 
sample in Devos et al. (2012) is constructed from companies in a common law country, the 
US, where there is more investor protection, and thus less need for ownership 
concentration to preserve rights.  Sweden, on the other hand, is a civil law country where 
investor protection is not as extensive and as a result relies more heavily on ownership 
concentration. This is a potential reason for why a significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage policies is found in 
the Swedish market, whereas a similar relationship was not found in the US market. 
Another potential reason may be that in this study the dependent variable includes both 
zero- and almost zero-leverage firms while Devos et al. (2012) strictly include zero-
leverage firms. 
The coefficient on institutional ownership should be negative since when ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of institutional owners they are likely to support value creating 
activities due to their diversified nature. In the same way they are likely to fight managers’ 
risk-reducing behaviour or sell their shares if they do not agree with managers’ decisions. 
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Either way, zero- or almost zero-leverage should be less likely in the presence of 
institutional investors compared to the reference case, private investors. The multivariate 
analysis reports the expected negative sign on the institutional ownership coefficient, it is 
however, not significant. It can therefore be concluded that hypothesis three is rejected, 
that is, companies where the maximum voteholder is an institutional investor are not 
significantly less likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy.   
Since the institutional variable can be interpreted inversely for private investors, we 
expect the coefficient to be positive for private investors. This is theoretically correct since 
private investors tend to be undiversified and thus prefer lower firm specific risk. 
Therefore, the likelihood of a firm being zero- or almost zero-levered is greater if the 
maximum voteholder is private, compared to institutional. As with institutional investors 
the sign of the coefficient is correct, but not significant. Thus, it can be concluded that 
investor type has no effect on firms' zero- or almost zero-leverage decisions. 
The results from the multivariate regressions on the ownership structure are to some 
extent in line with the univariate analysis. The diffuse ownership is clearly more prominent 
in zero- and almost zero leverage firms as predicted by the univariate analysis. However, 
the univariate analysis was inconclusive for concentrated ownership and investor type. 
5.3 Robustness 
To test the robustness of the results the sample was restricted in three different ways. 
Firstly, the sample was reduced to contain only firm observation from the NASDAQ OMX 
exchange. This was done since the univariate analysis revealed that smaller markets are 
possibly constrained in their debt capacity. Secondly, the industries that include firms that 
have attributes that usually characterise constrained firms; technology, health care and oil 
and gas, are excluded from the sample. Finally, to further address financial constraints the 
sample is divided into dividend payers and non-payers, since that has been done in 
previous research (Dang, 2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). The results are presented in 
tables 17, 18 and 19 in appendix A, respectively. Additionally, the regressions for the 
whole sample are presented again in table 16 in appendix A to facilitate comparison.  
Four of the control variables in all regressions; bankruptcy probability, dividends, size 
and tangibility, are always highly significant when they are run with the restricted 
samples, while the remaining three of the previously significant variables; investment 
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opportunities, non-debt tax shield and profitability, become insignificant in some of them. 
Despite the loss in significance, the McFadden R-squared increases. The reason for this is 
most likely that when the sample is restricted, it becomes more homogeneous than 
before and thus the model can more easily make correct predictions.  
5.3.1 Restriction 1: only NASDAQ OMX firm observations 
In the diffuse ownership regression the variable representing diffuse ownership becomes 
insignificant at the 5% threshold, but remains highly significant at the 10% threshold (see 
table 17 in appendix A). A possible reason for the insignificance on the more severe 
variable is that, as stated earlier, the NASDAQ OMX can be considered less financially 
constrained than the other three exchanges so when the constrained firms have been 
excluded from the sample the variable becomes insignificant. 
In the concentrated variable regression and the institutional ownership regression the 
variables remain the same as in the original model, that is, concentrated ownership is still 
highly significant in both while institutional ownership is not. The significance on the 
concentrated ownership variable indicates that financial constraints may not affect the 
relationship between zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage and concentrated 
ownership. 
5.3.2 Restriction 2: financially constrained industries excluded 
In the diffuse ownership regression both proxies defined by the two thresholds become 
insignificant (see table 18 in appendix A). Again, it becomes clear that financial constraints 
severely affect this variable since now the three most constrained industries have been 
removed from the original sample.  
The concentrated ownership variables that were significant in the concentrated 
ownership regression and the institutional ownership regression remain significant though 
the level decreases to 10%. Moreover, the institutional ownership variable is still 
insignificant. Now, some evidence that financial constraints also affect the concentrated 
ownership variable have emerged. 
5.3.3 Restriction 3: Non-dividend paying firm observations excluded 
When the regression models are run only on the dividend paying firms, that is, 
unconstrained firms, none of the ownership structure variables turn out to be significant 
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at any conventional significance levels (see table 19 in appendix A). Thereby, the suspicion 
that financial constraints affect the relationship between zero-leverage and ownership 
structure has increased. This result is especially surprising since it shows that the 
bankruptcy probability variable that was included in the models to account for differences 
in debt capacity seems to have failed its task as is discussed in section 5.2 Analysis and 
discussion above.  
In an attempt to confirm the suspicion that financial constraints affect the relationship 
between zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage and ownership structure, the regression 
is now run only on firms that do not pay dividends, constrained firms. The results from this 
regression can be seen in table 20 in appendix A. The results confirm the aforementioned 
suspicion, since now all ownership structure variables are significant, except institutional 
ownership variable, like it was in the original model. It is thus confirmed that financial 
constraints facilitate a relationship between zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage and 
ownership structure in the original sample.  
5.4 Does ownership structure explain the zero-leverage puzzle? 
The original ownership structure regressions report a statistically significant relationship 
between diffuse and concentrated ownership and zero- or almost zero-leverage policy 
within Swedish firms. Based on this analysis alone the answer to the research question 
would be that ownership structure can, at least partly, explain the zero-leverage puzzle.  
However, in light of the result from the robustness testing, the relationship can be 
called into question. The reasons for the significant relationship in the original multivariate 
regression can be attributed to financial constraints since the relationship progressively 
decreases in significance with every restriction applied to the sample. Furthermore, there 
is no relationship between owner identity and zero- and almost zero-leverage, neither in 
general nor for constrained firms.  
In summary of the multivariate regression analysis and the robustness testing the 
research question cannot be answered in the same way as before. Ownership structure 
can partly explain the zero-leverage puzzle in constrained firms, but not generally. This is 
consistent with the results of Devos et al. (2012) that financial constraints have an 
important role in explaining why firms remain zero-leveraged. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study set out to assess the relationship between ownership structure and zero- and 
almost zero-leverage on the Swedish market. The univariate analysis revealed that the 
zero-leverage phenomenon does indeed exist on the Swedish market. It showed that 35% 
of the firm year observations were zero- or almost zero-leverage in the sample period, 
2000-2013. Moreover, there is a clear clustering of zero- and almost zero-leverage firms in 
certain industries; health care, oil and gas and technology, and on the smaller stock 
exchanges; First North, NGM and AktieTorget. Furthermore, the characteristics of the 
zero- and almost zero-leveraged firms on the Swedish market were largely consistent with 
previous research from other countries. That is, zero- and almost zero-leverage Swedish 
firms are on average smaller, have lower probability of becoming bankrupt, lower 
tangibility and profitability, have greater investment opportunities, higher non-debt tax 
shield and pay higher dividends than their leveraged counterparts. 
The main finding of the multivariate analysis is that it supports two out of the three 
hypotheses. Firstly, hypothesis one is not rejected, that is, when ownership is diffuse firms 
are more likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-leverage policy. The reason for this is that 
when ownership is diffuse no single investor has incentive to monitor managers and to 
prevent managerial risk aversion. Secondly, hypothesis two is not rejected either, that is, 
when ownership is concentrated firms are less likely to follow a zero- or almost zero-
leverage policy. This result indicates that when ownership concentration increases, 
investors become larger and consequently have more incentive to monitor. Finally, no 
support is found for hypothesis three, indicating that owner identity does not affect zero- 
and almost zero-leverage policy in firms.  
These findings can perhaps not be considered generalisable since when restricting the 
sample, with different level of financial constraints, the results do not always hold. The 
main finding of this thesis is therefore that ownership structure can partly explain the 
zero-leverage puzzle in financially constrained firms only. 
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6.1 Limitations 
Two possible limitations of this study are worth mentioning. Firstly, firms can move from 
being zero- or almost zero-leveraged from one year to another. Here only firm year 
observations are examined and thus this transformation is not taken into account. 
Therefore, the persistency of a firm being zero- or almost zero-leveraged is not 
considered. This may prove to be problematic since an unaccompanied zero- or almost 
zero-leveraged observation in a firm may not be deliberate. If this is the case for many 
firms in the sample, an erroneous relationship may be drawn between zero- and almost 
zero-leverage and ownership structure, which does not exist. This limitation could be 
overcome by, for example, including only firms that have zero- or almost zero-leverage 
observations for at least half of the sample period. However, this procedure would result 
in other limitations, such as loss of information. Secondly, in this thesis only two owner 
identities are examined, institutional- and private investors. This may be problematic since 
the two groups are so broadly defined and therefore heterogeneous. If investors are 
divided into narrower categories the groups would be more internally homogenous, and 
therefore a significant relationship cannot be ruled out when using more owner identity 
types. This problem could possibly be overcome by adding insiders and family firms as an 
additional owner type. Unfortunately, the SIS database did not allow for facile extraction 
of this information.  
6.2 Further research 
As previously stated, none have, to our knowledge, combined these two fields of research: 
capital structure and ownership structure, in attempt to explain the puzzle. Therefore, due 
to the different amount of investor protection between legal systems, a similar research 
could be conducted in different countries to see if these results hold for other civil law 
countries, and if the results would be different for common law countries. Another 
potential research subject would be to explore previously mentioned limitations regarding 
few owner identity types. It would be interesting to see if a relationship exists, between 
zero- and almost zero-leveraged firms and owner identity, when the number of categories 
is increased. 
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It is evident that further research in this area is necessary since the zero-leverage 
puzzle remains unsolved. Thus, there is a need to conduct further research on this topic, 
but it is unclear where the answers can be found. 
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Table 15: Characteristics of firms by market 
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0,085*** 0,085*** 0,085*** 0,085***
(5,301) (5,278) (5,314) (5,306)
0,016 0,016 0,016 0,016
10,119*** 10,086*** 10,587*** 10,590***
(6,594) (6,576) (6,758) (6,760)
1,535 1,534 1,567 1,567
 -0,033**  -0,032*  -0,036**  -0,036**
(-1,852) (-1,795) (-2,042) (-2,033)
0,018 0,018 0,018 0,018
 -3,413**  -3,528**  -3,535**  -3,530**
(-2,408) (-2,517) (-2,502) (-2,496)
1,417 1,402 1,412 1,414
 -0,472*  -0,429* -0,315 -0,317
(-2,408) (-1,696) (-1,239) (-1,239)
1,417 0,253 0,254 0,255
 -0,976***  -0,987***  -1,007***  -1,004***
(-11,384) (-11,405) (-11,669) (-10,974)
0,086 0,087 0,086 0,092
 -3,311***  -3,293***  -3,115***  -3,114***
(-7,185) (-7,169) (-6,874) (-6,877)
0,461 0,459 0,453 0,453
 4,853***  4,880***  5,412***  5,400***
(8,105) (8,090) (8,656) (8,450)
0,599 0,603 0,625 0,639
0,736*
1,945
0,378
 -0,009***  -0,009***
(-3,419) (-3,369)
0,003 0,003
-0,013
(-0,105)
0,125
Exchanges Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2597 2597 2597 2597
Institutional 
investors
McFadden R-
squared
Size
0,306 0,307
Tangibility
Constant
Diffuse 
ownership
Concentrated 
ownership
Institutional 
ownership 
regression
0,310
Concentrated 
ownership 
regression
0,310
Control 
Variable 
Regression
Diffuse 
ownership 
regression
Bankruptcy 
Probability
Dividends
Investment 
Opportunities
Non-debt tax 
shield
Profitability
Table 16: Regressions for the whole sample 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile 
except Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. For the three categorical variables one 
dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and 
the year 2000. 
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0,093*** 0,093*** 0,093*** 0,093*** 0,093***
(4,631) (4,630) (4,679) (4,663) (4,663)
0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020
10,444*** 10,442*** 10,938*** 11,114*** 11,116***
(5,871) (5,870) (6,026) (6,116) (6,120)
1,779 1,779 1,815 1,1817 1,816
-0,026 -0,026 -0,031 -0,034 -0,035
(-0,883) (-0,883) (-1,050) (-1,154) (-1,178)
0,030 0,030 0,030 0,029 0,029
-0,551 -0,553 -0,488 -0,614 -0,653
(-0,227) (-0,227) (-0,201) (-0,253) (-0,269)
2,431 2,431 2,426 2,425 2,428
-0,589 -0,587 -0,496 -0,402 -0,396
(-1,606) (-1,591) (-1,343) (-1,083) (-1,066)
0,367 0,369 0,369 0,371 0,372
 -0,967***  -0,967***  -0,976***  -0,997***  -1,008***
(-9,750) (-9,747) (-9,833) (-10,019) (-9,457)
0,099 0,099 0,099 0,100 0,107
 -4,420***  -4,419***  -4,249***  -4,178***  -4,182***
(-6,786) (-6,787) (-6,634) (-6,590) (-6,585)
0,651 0,651 0,641 0,634 0,635
 4,865***  4,864***  5,094***  5,424***  5,473***
(6,895) (6,893) (7,117) (7,337) (7,236)
0,706 0,706 0,716 0,739 0,756
0,036
(0,067)
0,536
 -0,005*
(-1,933)
0,003
  -0,009***   -0,009***
(-2,738) (-2,635)
0,003 0,003
0,043
(0,295)
0,145
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
Tangibility
Control 
Variable 
Regression
Concentrated 
ownership 
regression
Institutional 
ownership 
regression
Diffuse 
ownership 
regression 5%
Bankruptcy 
Probability
Dividends
Investment 
Opportunities
Non-debt tax 
shield
Profitability
Size
Diffuse 
ownership 
regression 10%
0,352 0,355 0,355
Constant
Institutional 
investors
Diffuse 
ownership 5%
McFadden R-
squared
0,352
Diffuse 
ownership 
10%
Concentrated 
ownership
0,353
Table 17: Regressions for restriction 1 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile 
except Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. The sample in these regressions only consists 
of NASDAQ OMX firms. For the two categorical variables one dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the 
dummy variable trap these are industrials and the year 2000. Furthermore, due to the loss of observations when the 
sample is restricted utilities had to be excluded as well.  
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0,127*** 0,127*** 0,129*** 0,128*** 0,128***
(3,882) (3,865) (3,868) (5,671) (3,879)
0,856 0,033 0,033 0,896 0,033
7,292*** 7,277*** 7,289*** 7,485*** 7,499***
(3,668) (3,664) (3,669) (3,731) (3,738)
1,988 1,986 1,986 2,003 2,006
0,026 0,027 0,023 0,02 0,022
(0,951) (0,973) (0,857) 0,744 0,809
0,027 0,027 0,027 0,027 0,027
-5,634** -5,657** -5,556** -5,766** -5,681**
(-2,340) (-2,359) (-2,316) (-2,385) (-2,337)
2,408 2,398 2,399 2,417 2,431
0,335 0,371 0,372 0,478 0,466
(0,733) (0,807) (0,811) (1,036) (1,010)
0,457 0,46 0,459 0,462 0,466
-1,066*** -1,075*** -1,068*** -1,089*** -1,062***
(-9,027) (-9,023) (-9,029) (-9,155) (-8,317)
0,118 0,119 0,118 0,119 0,128
-3,743***  -3,738***  -3,719***  -3,591***  -3,593***
(-6,340) (-6,330) (-6,314) (-6,163) (-6,170)
0,59 0,591 0,589 0,583 0,582
4,693*** 4,730*** 4,655*** 5,083*** 4,969***
(5,482) (5,494) (5,440) (5,671) (5,400)
0,856 0,861 0,856 0,896 0,920
0,419
(0,847)
0,495
0,242
(0,971)
0,249
-0,006* -0,006*
(-1,805) (-1,861)
0,003 0,003
-0,103
(-0,598)
0,172
Exchanges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
McFadden R-
squared
0,330 0,330 0,331 0,332 0,332
Observations 1807 1807 1807 1807 1807
Institutional 
Ownership 
Regression
Bankruptcy 
probability
Tangibility
Control 
Variable 
Regression
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 5%
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 10%
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Regression
Dividends
Investment 
opportunities
Non-debt tax 
shield
Profitability
Size
Constant
Diffuse 
ownership 5%
Diffuse 
ownership 
10%
Concentrated 
ownership 5%
Institutional 
investors
Table 18: Regressions for restriction 2 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile except 
Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year.  The industries that include firms that have attributes 
that usually characterise constrained firms; technology, health care and oil & gas, are excluded from the sample. For the 
three categorical variables one dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the dummy variable trap these are 
NASDAQ OMX, industrials and the year 2000.  
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0,117** 0,117** 0,117** 0,118** 0,118**
(2,128) (2,125) (2,117) (2,086) (2,101)
0,055 0,055 0,055 0,057 0,056
9,572*** 9,536*** 9,563*** 9,828*** 9,835***
(3,891) (3,871) (3,881) (3,838) (3,930)
2,46 2,464 2,464 2,482 2,502
0,025 0,027 0,025 0,024 0,025
(0,473) (0,498) (0,460) 0,442 0,463
0,053 0,054 0,053 0,053 0,053
-8,839* -8,923* -8,713* -8,873* -8,927*
(-1,914) (-1,933) (-1,874) (-1,933) (-1,948)
4,618 4,612 4,650 4,590 4,583
0,309 0,306 0,315 0,337 0,313
(0,225) (0,224) (0,231) (0,247) (0,230)
1,372 1,369 1,364 1,366 1,362
-1,053***  -1,052***  -1,054*** -1,072*** -0,983***
(-8,216) (-8,227) (-8,206) (-8,102) (-6,763)
0,128 0,128 0,128 0,132 0,145
-4,492*** -4,494 -4,494  -4,420***  -4,468***
(-5,662) (-5,650) (-5,670) (-5,525) (-5,578)
0,793 0,795 0,793 0,800 0,802
5,052*** 5,064*** 5,047*** 5,287*** 4,912***
(5,239) (5,268) (5,223) (5,079) (4,574)
0,964 0,961 0,966 1,041 1,074
-0,581
(-0,919)
0,632
0,115
0,348
0,33
-0,003 -0,004
(-0,547) (-0,764)
0,005 0,005
-0,283
(-1,307)
0,217
Exchanges Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Yes Yes Yes Yes
McFadden R-squared 0,420 0,420 0,420 0,420 0,421
Observations 1358 1358 1358 1358 1358
Control 
Variable 
Regression
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 5%
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Regression
Institutional 
Ownership 
Regression
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 10%
Institutional 
investors
Concentrated 
ownership 5%
Diffuse ownership 
5%
Diffuse ownership 
10%
Bankruptcy 
probability
Dividends
Investment 
opportunities
Non-debt tax shield
Profitability
Size
Tangibility
Constant
Table 19: Regressions for restriction 3 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile except 
Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. The sample is restricted to only include dividend 
paying firm observations. For the three categorical variables one dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent 
the dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and the year 2000. Furthermore, due to the loss of 
observations when the sample is restricted NGM and oil & gas had to be excluded as well.  
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0,057*** 0,058*** 0,058*** 0,058*** 0,058***
(4,781) (4,767) (4,837) (4,879) (4,897)
0,012 0,012 0,012 0,012 0,012
-0,033** -0,032** -0,034**  -0,033**  -0,036**
(-2,230) (-2,132) (-2,313) (-2,237) (-2,352)
0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015
-1,603 -1,775 -1,574 -1,614 -1,628
(-1,258) (-1,417) (-1,256) (-1,283) (-1,283)
1,274 1,253 1,253 1,258 1,269
 -0,612***  -0,551**  -0,491**  -0,453*  -0,439*
(-2,610) (-2,317) (-2,092) (-1,931) (-1,866)
0,234 0,238 0,235 0,235 0,235
-0,622***  -0,653***  -0,666***  -0,664***  -0,697***
(-4,366) (-4,548) (-4,660) (-4,602) (-4,824)
0,142 0,144 0,143 0,144 0,145
 -2,67***  -2,583***  -2,538***  -2,459***  -2,493***
(-4,522) (-4,414) (-4,323) (-4,193) (-4,155)
0,586 0,582 0,587 0,586 0,600
2,886*** 2,988*** 2,806*** 3,440*** 3,570***
(3,166) (3,240) (3,033) (3,668) (3,813)
0,911 0,922 0,925 0,938 0,936
1,081**
(2,229)
0,485
0,742**
(3,682)
0,201
-0,011*** -0,010***
(-3,136) (-2,993)
0,003 0,003
0,269
(1,609)
0,167
Exchanges Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Yes Yes Yes Yes
McFadden R-squared 0,200 0,202 0,208 0,205 0,207
Observations 1166 1166 1166 1166 1166
Bankruptcy 
probability
Control 
Variable 
Regression
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 5%
Diffuse 
Ownership 
Regression 10%
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Regression
Institutional 
Ownership 
Regression
Investment 
opportunities
Non-debt tax shield
Profitability
Size
Tangibility
Constant
Diffuse ownership 
5%
Diffuse ownership 
10%
Concentrated 
ownership 5%
Institutional 
investors
Table 20: Regressions for non-dividend payers 
Coefficients, z-statistics (in parenthesis) and standard deviation are reported. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile except 
Size and Tangibility. All independent variables are lagged one year. The sample is restricted to only include non-dividend 
paying observations. For the three categorical variables one dummy variable is excluded from each to circumvent the 
dummy variable trap these are NASDAQ OMX, industrials and the year 2000. Furthermore, due to the loss of 
observations when the sample is restricted utilities had to be excluded as well. For obvious reasons, dividends are also 
excluded.  
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Table 21: Percentage of correct predictions 
Concentrated ownership model Dep. Variable = 0 Dep. Variable = 1 Total
% Correct 88,02% 59,95% 78,63%
% Incorrect 11,98% 40,05% 21,37%
Institutional ownership model Dep. Variable = 0 Dep. Variable = 1 Total
% Correct 88,02% 59,95% 78,63%
% Incorrect 11,98% 40,05% 21,37%
Diffuse ownership model Dep. Variable=0 Dep. Variable=1 Total
% Correct 87,96% 58,80% 78,21%
% Incorrect 12,04% 41,20% 21,79%
Table 22: Ljung-Box Q statistics 
Concentrated ownership model
Institutional ownership model
Diffuse ownership model
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 0.008 0.008 0.1775 0.673
2 -0.00... -0.00... 0.2488 0.883
3 -0.00... -0.00... 0.4881 0.921
4 -0.00... -0.00... 0.6337 0.959
5 0.005 0.005 0.7095 0.982
6 0.004 0.004 0.7622 0.993
7 0.002 0.002 0.7734 0.998
8 0.000 0.000 0.7737 0.999
9 0.000 0.000 0.7740 1.000
1... 0.000 0.000 0.7743 1.000
1... 0.000 0.000 0.7745 1.000
1... 0.000 -0.00... 0.7745 1.000
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 0.007 0.007 0.1469 0.702
2 -0.00... -0.00... 0.2166 0.897
3 -0.00... -0.00... 0.4433 0.931
4 -0.00... -0.00... 0.5810 0.965
5 0.005 0.005 0.6505 0.986
6 0.004 0.004 0.6993 0.995
7 0.002 0.002 0.7096 0.998
8 0.000 0.000 0.7098 1.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.7100 1.000
1... 0.000 0.000 0.7103 1.000
1... 0.000 0.000 0.7104 1.000
1... 0.000 -0.00... 0.7104 1.000
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 0.026 0.026 1.8808 0.170
2 -0.00... -0.00... 1.9095 0.385
3 -0.01... -0.01... 2.2202 0.528
4 -0.01... -0.00... 2.4988 0.645
5 0.008 0.009 2.6923 0.747
6 0.007 0.006 2.8309 0.830
7 0.005 0.005 2.9129 0.893
8 0.000 0.000 2.9131 0.940
9 0.001 0.001 2.9144 0.968
1... 0.001 0.001 2.9159 0.983
1... 0.001 0.001 2.9169 0.992
1... -0.00... -0.00... 2.9169 0.996
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Table 23: Correlation Matrix 
Bank. Div Invest. NDTS Profit Size Tangi AktieT. NGM First N. Basic M. Con. G. Con. S. Fin. Health O & G Tech. Telec. Utili. Conc. Inst. Diffus.
Bankruptcy probability 1,00
Dividends 0,13 1,00
Investment opportunities 0,23 0,09 1,00
Non-debt tax shield -0,15 -0,10 0,15 1,00
Profitability 0,07 0,35 -0,17 -0,24 1,00
Size -0,13 0,09 -0,24 -0,32 0,38 1,00
Tangibility -0,16 -0,03 -0,14 -0,01 0,14 0,27 1,00
AktieTorget 0,03 -0,06 0,06 0,09 -0,18 -0,39 -0,04 1,00
NGM 0,12 -0,09 0,13 0,10 -0,14 -0,17 -0,09 -0,05 1,00
First North -0,01 -0,05 0,05 0,13 -0,15 -0,36 -0,09 -0,12 -0,07 1,00
Basic Materials -0,05 -0,03 -0,06 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,25 -0,01 -0,04 0,07 1,00
Consumer Goods -0,04 0,03 0,00 -0,02 0,05 0,05 0,01 0,00 -0,05 0,00 -0,07 1,00
Consumer Sevices 0,04 0,10 0,04 0,10 0,05 -0,04 0,01 0,00 0,05 0,13 -0,09 -0,10 1,00
Financials 0,05 -0,02 -0,18 -0,31 0,02 0,33 0,18 -0,06 0,06 -0,09 -0,11 -0,12 -0,15 1,00
Health Care 0,13 -0,13 0,15 0,00 -0,18 -0,19 -0,15 0,10 0,02 -0,02 -0,10 -0,11 -0,13 -0,15 1,00
Oil & Gas 0,05 -0,09 0,02 0,06 -0,09 -0,11 0,09 0,06 0,08 0,07 -0,05 -0,05 -0,06 -0,07 -0,07 1,00
Technology -0,04 0,04 0,03 0,06 -0,01 -0,19 -0,23 -0,04 -0,07 0,06 -0,10 -0,11 -0,14 -0,17 -0,15 -0,07 1,00
Telecommunications -0,02 0,09 -0,01 0,15 0,05 0,10 0,02 0,00 -0,02 -0,05 -0,03 -0,03 -0,04 -0,05 -0,04 -0,02 -0,05 1,00
Utilities -0,02 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 0,02 -0,01 0,11 0,10 -0,01 0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,01 1,00
Concentrated ownership -0,02 0,12 -0,08 -0,05 0,21 -0,05 0,08 0,06 -0,04 -0,02 -0,06 0,03 0,08 0,03 -0,01 -0,19 -0,06 0,03 -0,03 1,00
Institutional Investor -0,05 0,05 -0,04 -0,10 0,10 0,46 0,05 -0,17 -0,10 -0,19 0,03 0,01 -0,01 0,08 -0,09 -0,05 -0,08 0,06 -0,01 -0,17 1,00
Diffuse ownership 0,01 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 -0,10 0,02 0,04 0,00 -0,02 0,05 0,05 -0,02 -0,04 0,08 -0,02 0,05 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,27 0,06 1,00
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Figure 2: Zero-leverage in Sweden by industry 
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